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Abstract—BGP is the de facto protocol used for inter-
autonomous system routing in the Internet. Generally 
speaking, BGP has been proven to be secure, efficient, 
scalable, and robust. However, with the rapid evolving of 
the Internet in the past few decades, there are increasing 
concerns about BGS’s ability to meet the needs of the 
Internet routing. There are two major limitations of BGP 
which are its failure to address several key security issues, 
and some operational related problems. The design and 
ubiquity of BGP have complicated past efforts at securing 
inter-domain routing. This paper surveys the past work 
related to BGP security and operational issues. We explore 
the limitations and advantages of proposed solutions in 
these two limitations. 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The Internet is a global, decentralized network 
comprised of many smaller interconnected networks. 
Networks are largely comprised of end systems, referred 
to as hosts, and intermediate systems, called routers. 
Information travels through a network on one of many 
paths, which are selected through a routing process. 
Routing protocols communicate reachability information 
(how to locate other hosts and routers) and ultimately 
perform path selection. 
 
The Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) is an inter-
autonomous system (AS) routing protocol. An 
autonomous system is an administrative domain. That is, 
it is a network or group of networks under a common 
administration and with common routing policies. BGP is 
used to exchange routing information in the Internet and 
is the protocol used by default to communicate between 
Internet service providers (ISP). Customer networks, such 
as universities and corporations, usually employ protocols 
known as Interior Gateway Protocol (IGP) to exchange 
routing information within their networks. Examples of 
IGPs are Routing Information Protocol (RIP) and Open 
shortest Path Protocol (OSPF). Customers connect to 
ISPs, and ISPs use BGP to exchange customer and ISP 
routes. A network under the administrative control of a 
single organization is called an autonomous system (AS) 
[18]. There are two types of routing, intra-domain routing 
which is the process of routing within an AS, and inter-
domain routing which is the process of routing among 
different ASes. BGP is the dominant inter-domain routing 
protocol on the Internet (BGP) [45]. BGP has been 
deployed since the commercialization of the Internet, and 
version 4 of the protocol has been in wide use for over a 
decade. There are two variations of BGP: Interior BGP 
(IBGP), which is used by ISPs to exchange routing 
information within an AS; and External BGP (EBGP), 
which is used to exchange routes among autonomous 
systems. Figure 1 illustrates the difference IBGP and 
EBGP.  
BGP is a simple protocol and it generally works well in 
practice. Thus, it has played a fundamental role within the 
global Internet [17], despite providing no performance or 
security guarantees. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: IBGP vs. EBGP 
 
 
Unfortunately, due to the limited guarantees provided 
by BGP, it sometimes causes serious instability and 
outages. Unlike other routing protocols that have limited 
failing impact and scope, BGP problems may result in 
significant and widespread damage. 
Current research on BGP focuses on addressing and 
resolving issues related with both operational and 
security. Operational concerns relating to BGP, such as 
scalability (i.e when routing tables grow very huge), 
convergence delay (i.e., the time required for all routers 
to have a consistent view of the network), routing 
stability and oscillation, and performance, have been 
addressed the most and were the major concern for both 
research and industry communities. 
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On the other hand, much of the occurring security 
research has focused on the issues related to 
authentication, authorization, integrity, confidentiality, 
and validation of BGP messages. These two fields of 
operational issues and security research are inherently 
connected. That is, successes and failures in each domain 
affect the other domain also and resolving an issue related 
to one domain is helpful to both communities. 
This paper investigates ongoing research in inter-
domain routing from the aspects of operational practice, 
standards activity, and security, exposing the similarities 
and differences in the proposed approaches towards 
building a more efficient and secure Internet 
infrastructure. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next 
section presents background about BGP from operational 
and security points of view. Section III describes BGP 
security issues and proposed solutions. In Section IV we 
focus on issues related to BGP functionality that have 
been addressed in the literature. Finally, Section V 
concludes the paper. 
II.  BACKGROUND 
The Internet is a global, decentralized network 
comprised of tens of thousands of smaller interconnected 
networks. These networks are known as Autonomous 
Systems (ASes). The Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) is 
the routing protocol used to exchange information 
between these ASes. Each BGP-speaking router sends an 
announcement message when a new route is discovered, 
and a withdrawal message is also sent when a route no 
longer exists. BGP is also a path-vector protocol. That’s 
is, when a router advertises a path, it adds its AS number 
to the beginning of the AS path. The BGP is also policy-
based; each router selects the best possible BGP route for 
each destination prefix and may apply complex policies 
for selecting such a route. It also decides whether to 
advertise the route to a neighboring router in another AS. 
In this section, we present an overview of the issues 
related to the inter-domain routing in the Internet and 
describe some of the BGP’s major problems. These 
problems mainly caused by the following reasons: (i) 
uncertainty about the relationship between IP prefixes 
and the AS numbers of the ASes who manage them, (ii) 
the use of the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) as the 
underlying transport protocol, and (iii) the potential to 
tamper with route announcements in order to subvert 
BGP routing policy. 
 
A. IBGP scalability issue 
An autonomous system that deploys Internal BGP 
(IBGP) must have all of its routers that speak iBGP 
connected to each other through IBGP sessions in a full 
mesh so that each router can communicate directly with 
others. Since the full-mesh configuration requires that 
each router maintain a session to every other router in the 
network, the number of sessions is O(n
2
) where n is the 
number of routers that speak IBGP. When the network 
grows and number of routers increases, the number of 
sessions may degrade the performance of routers, due 
either to inefficient resources such as memory, or very 
high CPU utilization. 
To overcome this issue, two solutions were proposed 
route reflectors and confederations. Both techniques 
reduce the number of IBGP sessions need to be 
maintained in the network and consequently reduce 
processing overhead. While route reflectors are 
considered a pure performance-enhancing technique [17], 
route confederations are mainly used to implement more 
fine-grained policy. 
However, these alternatives can introduce a set of 
problems of their own, including the following: 
1. route oscillation;  
2. sub-optimal routing; and  
3. increase of BGP convergence time [9]  
 
B. Instability issue 
Since routing table have to be consistent with network, 
the routing tables managed by a BGP implementation are 
adjusted continually to reflect actual changes in the 
network infrastructure. Examples of such changes are 
links breaking and being restored or routers going down 
and coming back up. These events happen almost 
continuously in the network as a whole and they are 
considered normal. However, the frequency of these 
events should be low for a specific router or link. When a 
router is misconfigured or mismanaged then it may get 
into a frequent cycle of going down (withdrawal) and 
then up (reannouncement). Consequently, this pattern of 
repeated route withdrawal and then reannouncement can 
result in abnormal activity in all the routers that know 
about the broken link, as the same route is continuously 
injected and withdrawn from the routing tables. This 
problem is known as route flapping. 
 
C. Routing table growth issue 
One of the key issues faced by BGP is the growth of 
the routing table. This issue comes into picture when the 
routing table grows to the point where some older, less 
capable, routers cannot cope with the resource 
requirements for maintaining the routing table. Thus, 
these routers will cease to be effective gateways between 
the parts of the Internet they connect. Furthermore, larger 
routing tables usually take longer time to stabilize on a 
path when a major routing table change occurs, which 
affects the network service reliability and availability. 
 
D. Load-balancing issue 
Another factor causing this growth of the routing table 
is the need for load balancing of multi-homed networks. 
It is not a trivial task to balance the inbound traffic to a 
multi-homed network across its multiple inbound paths, 
due to limitation of the BGP route selection process. For 
a multi-homed network, if it announces the same network 
blocks across all of its BGP peers, the result may be that 
one or several of its inbound links become congested 
while the other links remain under-utilized, because 
external networks all picked that set of congested paths as 
optimal. Like most other routing protocols, the BGP 
protocol does not detect congestion. 
E. Security Issues 
In the last decade, several major incidents and attacks 
have been reported regarding compromising of the 
routing infrastructure on the Internet. Many of these 
incidents and attacks have resulted in issues such as 
misrouted traffic and denial of services (DoS). One of the 
subjects that have been studied widely is the prefix hijack 
attack in which hackers update BGP routing tables with 
false origin information which causes serious 
consequences when this information are propagated. 
These attacks need to be detected early and accurately so 
that their propagation through the Internet can be stopped 
and damage can be mitigated quickly. Early approaches 
to develop BGP security extensions have failed, but new 
research directions in heuristic, data driven approaches to 
suppressing erroneous and malicious BGP messages 
show some practical promise. 
III.  BGP SECURITY ISSUES 
 
The BGP security issues have been widely investigated 
by the research community. The Internet Engineering 
Task force (IETF) has discussed some of the main 
security problems related to BGP, proposed possible In 
attempt to overcome BGP security issues, several  
extensions for BGP have been proposed. Kent et al. [19] 
proposed a secure, scalable, deployable architecture (S-
BGP) for an authorization and authentication system that 
addresses most of the security problems associated with 
BGP. They discussed the vulnerabilities and security 
requirements associated with BGP, described the S-BGP 
countermeasures. They also provided a comparison of 
their architecture to other approaches that have been 
proposed, analyzed the performance implications of the 
proposed countermeasures, and addressed operational 
issues. 
 
White et al. [9] proposed secure origin BGP (soBGP), 
where origin authentication is accomplished in an 
oligarchy PKI similar to that in S-BGP. The main 
difference between S-BGP and soBGP is that soBGP 
does not use cryptographic mechanisms to secure the 
authenticity of the entire AS PATH. It instead verifies AS 
paths against a database of AS-to-AS routing 
relationships. soBGP validates the correctness and 
authorization of the data carried within BGP, and also  
prevents the sorts of attacks resulting from 
misconfiguration or intentional insertion of bad data into 
the Internet routing system. 
Kruegel et al. [7] proposed a method for detecting 
malicious inter-domain routing update messages by 
monitoring BGP traffic.  
Goodell et al. propose IRV [5] that works with BGP to 
maintain dedicated verification servers and to verify the 
authenticity of BGP advertisements. 
Yu et al. propose a mutual trust-based scheme to evaluate 
authenticity of BGP advertisements [10]. Their method is 
incrementally deployable, protects against shilling 
attacks, and deters malicious operator behavior.  
Aiello et al. also address the problem of origin 
authentication through the use of Address Delegation 
Graph (ADG) [4]. Subramanian et al. propose a method 
called Listen and Whisper [8], which eliminates a large 
number of problems due to router misconfigurations and 
can detect and contain isolated adversaries that propagate 
even a few invalid route announcements.  
Hu et al. propose a new protocol called Secure Path 
Vector (SPV) [6] focus on securing BGP update 
messages against attacks and addresses AS PATH 
authentication through the use of one-time signatures and 
symmetric cryptographic primitives. They also limit the 
use of expensive public-key cryptography.  
IV.  BGP OPERATIONAL ISSUES 
 
EBGP is a path vector protocol, which means that 
loops in routing paths are detected and avoided by 
checking for multiple occurrences of an AS in the 
AS_PATH at each BGP node. 
 
However, this scheme cannot be used to detect loops in 
IBGP since all the speakers belong to the same AS. Thus, 
to avoid loops in IBGP, every BGP router is required to 
maintain an IBGP session with all other BGP routers 
within the AS. Obviously maintaining a full mesh of 
IBGP sessions is not scalable. To overcome this 
scalability issue, there are two common IBGP 
configuration schemes: AS confederations and route 
reflections [17]. Using route reflections and AS 
confederations may cause several operational problems 
such as routing oscillations.  
 
Varadhan et.al. [20] were the first to discuss the 
possibility of persistent route oscillations in BGP even in 
simple topologies. They showed that the oscillation cause 
was not the policy configuration of one AS alone; but it 
occurs due to interaction between the policies of several 
ASes. They further showed that these anomalies can 
occur without any misconfiguration and they are difficult 
to diagnose and resolve. 
 
Griffin et.al. [11] introduced the Stable Paths Problem 
(SPP) as a formal model for vector routing model in 
general and for BGP specifically. They used their 
framework to provide a sufficient condition for protocol 
convergence, which is the absence of dispute wheels. 
Unfortunately, they showed that the problem of detecting 
whether stable routing exists, given all the policies in the 
network, is NP-complete. They also showed that the 
existence of a stable solution does not automatically 
imply that a routing protocol can find it. Later Griffin et 
al. [13] showed that route oscillations can occur even 
without taking MED. 
There have been several follow ups to investigate these 
routing anomalies. One of the approaches to eliminate 
MED oscillations, was proposed by Basu et al. [1]. They 
proposed to change the protocol such that the oscillation 
problem vanishes. Basu et al. [1] also presented a 
counterexample for the solution provided by Walton et al. 
[12]. However, Griffin [37] showed that the method 
proposed in [1] has had scaling issues. In [37], Griffin et 
al. analyzed the oscillations and loops due to path 
asymmetry using a graph theoretic approach. They 
further proved that detecting such anomalies is NP hard.  
In [14], Musunuri et al. proposed to modify the IBGP 
protocol to eliminate these anomalies. Their method is 
based on applying IBGP with some restrictions on the 
IBGP configuration. They also assume a full mesh of 
IBGP sessions among all the border speakers. However, 
this is not very practical as it seems similar to assuming a 
full mesh of IBGP sessions between all the BGP 
speakers.  
In [16], Gobjuka studied forwarding loops caused by 
IBGP misconfiguration. He showed that finding 
forwarding loops in IBGP networks is inherently hard. He 
further proposed a polynomial-time algorithm for 
clustering ASes and he showed that the AS configured 
using his method results in forwarding-loop free network.  
Later, in [15] Musunuri et al. proposed another 
changes to IBGP to solve the problems due to both MED 
attribute and path asymmetry. 
 
Gao and Rexford [3] studied the Internet economics 
and showed that it could naturally guarantee route 
stability. Specifically, they show that a hierarchical 
business structure underlying the graph representation of 
the AS, in combination with routing policies is sufficient 
for protocol convergence. In this structure, they followed 
the customer-provider relationships between different 
ASes.  
 
In a follow-up research [2], Feamster et.al. improved 
this result and demonstrate that certain rankings that are 
commonly used in practice may not ensure routing 
stability. Further, they proved that the routing system will 
converge to a stable path when providers can set rankings 
and filters autonomously. 
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
BGP has been very successful in providing stable and 
robust inter-domain routing. BGP is widely deployed 
globally and it is the only Inter-domain routing protocol 
in wide use, consequently, it has gained increasing 
interest in both research and industrial communities. 
In this article, we first provide some background about 
BGP and related operational and security issues. Then we 
investigated some of the work that has been done to 
address these concerns.  
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